Lloyd Constantine was the antitrust chief for the New York Attorney General''s Office for more than a decade, then founded a law firm in 1994; he has also co-written [[ASIN:1607146150 Journal of the Plague Year: An Insider''s Chronicle of Eliot Spitzer''s Short and Tragic...
Lloyd Constantine was the antitrust chief for the New York Attorney General''s Office for more than a decade, then founded a law firm in 1994; he has also co-written
Journal of the Plague Year: An Insider''s Chronicle of Eliot Spitzer''s Short and Tragic Reign
He wrote in the Prologue to this 2009 book, "[In 1989] I was just beginning to realize the magnitude of what would be involved in our attempts to break up the Entreé joint venture... MasterCard''s discussion about discrediting me suggested that what we had discovered, in a relatively cursory investigation of Visa and MasterCard, was just the tip of an anticompetitive iceberg. Moreover, the broader issues of what I considered to be the abandonment of antitrust enforcement by the Department of Justice... was a matter of great importance to the economy of the country... the Reagan-Bush officials at the Fed were fanatical believers that the market could cure everything and always deliver optimal results... The result was a great transfer of wealth from stores and consumers into the pockets of the banks and Visa/MasterCard. I swallowed my private anger against MasterCard, and proceeded in court with the Entreé case... The inside story of that ... case, which lasted more than seven years, is the subject of this book." (Pg. xii-xiii) Later, he adds, "That 1989 lawsuit... forced Visa and MasterCard to abandon their joint debit card operation and laid the groundwork for the Merchants'' case. The Merchants'' case was the contest that I had been training for all my life." (Pg. 10)
He states, "The overarching allegation in the Entreé complaint was that the new network was not really designed to operate actively so much as serve as an obstacle to the expansion of other fledgling debit card networks. Entreé fell apart as soon as we filed the complaint... the associations'' lack of resolve soon became apparent. I believe one reason their quickly threw in the towel was MasterCard''s post-traumatic stress, resulting from our discovery of their discussion about threatening me." (Pg. 25)
He explains, "The United States claimed [in its own case]... that Visa and MasterCard''s exclusionary rules suppressed competition from American Express, Discover and others by barring their banks from issuing American Express or Discover brand credit or debit cards of the cards of any other network that Visa/MasterCard considered to be a competitor... Our focus had been on how these rules injured competition in the debit card market." (Pg. 91-92)
He recalls, "To show the defendants'' contempt for common people, we showed another analysis prepared by Andersen for Visa... Over and over again, the analysis said that what was bad for consumers, stores and competition was good for Visa and MasterCard and vice versa." (Pg. 156) Eventually, "I accepted the fact that the case would settle. That night, the merchants, MasterCard and Visa signed short-form, but binding, memoranda of understanding containing the outlines of the Settlement. At that moment, I surrendered my plans for a beautiful trial."
He concludes, "At the moment that I realized I would eventually receive enough money that I never had to work again, I also realized that I must continue working. I thought that I needed to win the case. Though I''m very happy that we won, as I am happy about the money, I didn''t really need the victory. I needed the game, the battle and the stretch. I needed to have a case in which we needed to do, and did, everything. I needed the work." (Pg. 245-246)
Not always a "page turner," this book is still an informative look at the anticompetitive practices of these two companies, and will interest many readers.